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Grammatical Discovery Procedure and the Egyptian-Coptic Nominal Sentence*

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The book before us is not a reworking of the author's 1970 University of Chicago dissertation — and this is a disappointment, for here one misses much important information on the Nominal Sentence (NS) which was provided in the dissertation, such as predicate constituency (Chap. I), predicate determination (II) and apposition (V). Yet the present monograph merits more attention than might seem called for at first glance; more, indeed, than is warranted by its contribution to our understanding of the grammatical phenomena discussed. For this is the first time that a method-conscious linguist treats this issue comprehensively, in a way representative of a major methodological trend of present-day Egyptology: the generative-transformational method.

My observations will focus first on questions of method and then on specifics of fundamental importance. To the former I shall devote more space than would be called for in reviewing a comparable work on, say, English or Japanese, for the methodological vacuum in current Egyptian descriptive linguistics poses a serious threat to the sound evolution of the field. I will make no bones about my sense of alarm at the thought that the author's approach might come to dominate current Egyptian linguistics or exert a lasting influence on its future. Thus, if I sometimes have to sound severe in this review, I beg to be excused on grounds of the crucial importance of the issues under discussion.

Reference will be made in particular to the following Egyptological studies:

POLOTSKY 1962   Polotsky, H. J., "Nominalsatz und Cleft Sentence im Koptischen", *Or* 31:413-430 (= *Collected Papers* 418-435).

    1976   "Les transpositions du verbe en égyptien classique", *Israel Oriental Studies* 5:1-50.

    CP   *Collected Papers*, Jerusalem 1971. (*Grundlagen des koptischen Satzbaues*, a comprehensive treatise on Coptic syntax by H. J. Polotsky, discussing *inter alia* the Cleft Sentence and Nominal Sentence, is in the press).

SHISHA-HALEVY 1981   Shisha-Halevy, A., "Bohairic-Late Egyptian Diaglosses: A Contribution to the Typology of Egyptian", in D. W. Young, ed., *Studies Presented to H. J. Polotsky*, Beacon Hill, 315-338.

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* A structuralist's observations in the margin of J. B. Callender's Generative *Studies in the Nominal Sentence in Egyptian and Coptic* (University of California Publications: Near Eastern Studies, 24. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, University of California Press, 1984. IX-221 p. 17,3 × 25,2. $21.00).

1983 "Middle Egyptian Gleanings: Grammatical Notes on the 'Middle Egyptian' Text of Matthew", *CdE* 58:311-319.

1984 "Notes on Some Nominal Sentence Patterns", in: *Studien zur Sprache und Religion Ägyptens* (Festschrift W. Westendorf), Göttingen, I 175-189.

1986 *Coptic Grammatical Categories: Structural Studies in the Syntax of Shenoutean Coptic*, AnOr 53, Rome.

1. Critique of Method

In the present case interrogating the apparatus of investigation is even more important than interrogating the representation. The author does not bother to clarify or justify his methodological orientation, as if no other model of grammatical analysis were conceivable but the generative-transformational one. As a matter of fact, generative linguistics is today no longer taken for granted even in the United States. Indeed, it is often being quietly abandoned as a linguistic model where well-tended languages are concerned (while still entrenched where it was institutionalized in its heyday). But the Egyptian languages are vulnerable and need in this sense more protection against methodologically unsound description than, say, English or the Germanic, Romance or Classical languages with their sturdy grammatical traditions rooted in solid philology. It is easy to see what vitiates the generative method, and the points I shall rehearse are all well-worn (see especially B. Collinder's *Noam Chomsky und die generative Grammatik*, Uppsala 1970; E. M. Uhlenbeck's *Critical Comments on Transformational-Generative Grammar* 1962-1972, The Hague, 1973; and I. Robinson's *The New Grammarians' Funeral*, Cambridge 1975.

(a) At best, generative linguistics is a meta-grammatical theory. It is neither a discovery method nor a theoretical basis for a set of descriptive statements. Indeed, it assumes that discovery procedure is trivial, a set of results which are already "given" (as far as Callender's study is concerned, Till's *Koptische Grammatik* seems to be the authority on the grammatical consensus). Its proper object of inquiry is grammar, not language (i.e. not *la parole* as manifested in *testi di lingua*). The imposition of a preanalytical or preteranalytical model upon the facts is represented by the author as «general linguistic perspective» (195), "capturing the general principle at work" (193) and is matched by "general considerations" (*ibid.*) for arguments and "general theoretical work" (21) for authority; it is for him a warrant to overrule the validity of such descriptively accountable phenomena as the apposition of noun to a preceding pronoun. The tree model itself, which features frequently in this work, exhibits but does not explain; it is not *per se* a theory, but one of many graphic ways of "reduction of syntagmatical complexities"; although it can be easily misrepresented as being a theory this model amounts to little more than an artificial imposition upon the data. At worst, the generative approach is unscientific, since it is entirely axiomatic, having little or no empirical ambition for all its appearance of being firmly grounded in source material. It cannot be relied upon for primary descriptive information. Its "rules" override each other — "the rule for clefting overrides the rule for relative clause attachment" (188) — and thus are prescriptive; it cannot pass the ultimate test of descriptive procedure: to write a grammar satisfying a corpus, with verifiable statements conveying structural (rela-

tional) information. Moreover, it exhibits a lack of focus, an unhappy intellectual levelling process, a reductionist preoccupation with the obvious, transmuting the deep into the shallowest, trivializing phenomena and causing insurmountable aporias that should not have arisen in the first place.

As I shall show in this review, the facile reduction of complexities which results from the author's approach often leads him to outright misrepresentation and nothing less than an abdication of descriptive responsibility.

(b) *Evidence and corpus.* Apparently frivolous in his choice of examples, Callender never specifies his data base or corpus, which is bad enough for Coptic but intolerable for Egyptian. His source is "the corpus" (34, 36, 46, 69; "the inventory of this study", 8), meaning no corpus. "The corpus" looks like an admixture of the Sahidic NT and Leipoldt's Shenoute (conveniently selective in either case, with quotes from Till and Crum thrown in; distortion by exclusion is a pervasive feature of this study). For Coptic, the Sahidic basis ought to have been made explicit, for the Bohairic NS presents a very different picture. The author's statement that "[The rules in point] admittedly do not always seems to work for Bohairic" (23) is deceptive, for it suggests that other rules do, thus implying the pan-Coptic validity of his results. As for Egyptian, assertions like "Unfortunately total purity in an ancient Egyptian linguistic sample is a practical impossibility because of the nature and limited amount of the evidence" (129) do not enhance one's confidence in the author's conception of linguistic data. Needless to say, mere statistics have no probative value (e.g. for the # NOUN + NOUN # nexus "statistically rather rare" [143], or "restricted usage", "statistical frequency" [163] – in comparison with that of the copula) without the exhaustive evidence of a precisely defined corpus (the pattern is not as rare as all that in the Pyramid Texts, for example).

(c) The generativist criteria of "grammaticality", "well-formedness", "acceptability" (with such tell-tale catchwords as "legitimate", "tolerate", "impossible" etc.), besides being subjective, always are a matter of statistics, are corpus-relative and are open to controversy. As is well known, reaching a consensus on the question of acceptability is impossible in living languages, let alone in dead ones, and especially on points of scalar value; one can but wonder who the author's informant is — I fear that it is simply his *Sprachgefühl*. Needless to say, this kind of subjectivity obscures really significant non-occurrences and rareties which may be due to not only to text-grammatical parameters but also to systemic factors. Corpus and evidence, not the linguist's judgement, determine grammaticality; what is attested is *ipso facto* acceptable data for grammatical description. Condemning, for instance (93), "John will go tomorrow" in response to "Who went to the bank yesterday?" as "ungrammatical (i.e. contextually bizarre)" — and thus implicitly defining "grammatical" as "contextually non-bizarre" — shows how far removed the author's conception of language is from linguistic reality and how easily he makes things suit himself. To pick some examples at random: *Pa-pai* is considered "ungrammatical, not elsewhere [than what?] attested" (55). "[A noun] may be substituted" [for a pronoun — itself a linear substitute for a noun!] "without affecting the grammaticality of the sentence" (56) — even though it is all a matter of signalling referential identity. "Grades of impossibility", marked by a number of asterisks on a scale of demerit, are assigned without obvious control or explanation, giving the false impression that they might be based on a questionnaire and on judgment statistics: (52) "the awkward sequence *ntok de ntk–ntok*" (see below);

(54) "**ete-tagapě te ntekhagiosuně pinoc ndōron ndōron" ("if the pronominalization of the subject had not been applied") for the actual *pinoc ndōron ete... te*): whereby the author carelessly proposes (and this has little to do with pronominalization) to turn an antecedent into an appositive subject, ignoring the special structure of the hermeneutical *ete...pe/ete pai pe...* (see below, 4[b₃]); in the case (62) of "*ou-pe rōme ntainau erof*" etc., he proposes to "cleft" components of the noun syntagm, though actually focalized are either the noun syntagm or a pronoun anaphoric to the determinator (nucleus of the noun syntagm).

(d) Dynamism pervades the author's description and is doubtless its most fatal flaw. (As for "generating": who or what is the generator? The shift, unheralded, perhaps even unconscious, from "speaker generates language" to "grammar generates language" to "one element of grammar generates another" [a chain reaction!] is a special methodological entanglement: "Coptic may generate a definite article" [p. 14], "a definite article generated by a following genitive phrase" [101].) Here the fundamental misconception lies in mixing the speaker's model with the listener's model, whereas it is only the latter (with the linguist approximating the decoding listener) that can provide a legitimate basis for description.

The author's vague and obfuscating use of the term "derivation" (so valuable under other circumstances for observations of word-formation) and other expressions of dynamism in a twilight zone of synchrony and diachrony, description and meta-linguistic manipulation lend, for any structuralist reader, an almost nightmarish quality to this exposition. "Derivation" is used for historical reflex statements (145), "there exist as well (in LE) patterns with no overt copula, which we shall argue are mostly derived from Middle Egyptian prototypes..."; (113) Coptic *n-* (plur. def. article) is "derived" from *nì*. It is used of the linguist's operation, meta-linguistically "deriving" a reconstruction (159). It is used of synchronic polyfunctionalism (i.e. hierarchy of primary/secondary functions?): (157) "The copula *pw...* is generally believed to be derived from a homeomorphic [for homonymic?] demonstrative set *pw/tw/nw*". We also find "directed" synchronic, i.e. transformational, "derivation" from existing patterns: (123) "one can transformationally derive a simpler form from a more complex one but not conversely" — are then converted/negated forms the basis for basic/affirmative ones? As a matter of fact, in the case in point — the nexus of pronouns and noun lexemes — it is the other way around: pronouns can be and often are appositively "lexicalized" by noun syntagms or herald them cataphorically. At (193) we find that "such sentences [i.e. Coptic *NP pe*, as if this were a single pattern] must be derived anyway as pronominal forms of sentences with overt noun subjects": it is not clear whether "must be derived" (or "is to be derived", 179) implies a meta-meta-linguistic procedural instruction or indicates a possibility of analysis (when he says that the cleft sentence is "only" a form of the *basic* pronominal pattern, the author inadvertently reverses the direction). Still other meanings of "derive": "derivation" of a textual segment (clause) from a postulated (not actual!) "alternative" one (179); derivation of a component of a syntagm — occupant of a tagmemic slot — from outside *la parole* (169, a Cleft Sentence "stresses what originate as object noun phrases in underlying structure"); derivation of an element semantically, not syntactically defined from a postulated level (39, "The transformational origin of the various adverbials... is complex ... at some level of remote structure they will have been adverbial predicates..." — note the vagueness of "some level of remote structure" and the evasive "will have been"). The term "transition" is used with similar befogging effet

(3), "transition from independent word to linking word". So is "conversion" (33, conversion of "noun phrases from verbal expressions") and of course the typical formations in *-ization* (as in "pronominalization", "circumstantialization", which would be useful, if they were meant only in the sense "marked as..."). Further dynamist confusions: (195) "Only in Coptic is a copula finally added [to a pattern not occurring in Coptic!], almost, it seems, as an afterthought" — whose? and by whom "added", the speaker, the language or the meta-linguistic orchestrator? Or can an afterthought be attributed to a historical process? Note, three pages earlier, a warning against the confusion of synchronic considerations with diachronic ones (192). "No semantic trace of the original meaning 'do/make' remains" he says, *à propos r-/o n-* in Coptic (99); "*o n-* has developed the meaning 'be' from the stative meaning 'has been made into/as'": is this a historical scenario or "synchronic dynamism"?

(e) The author seems unaware of the special ethnocentric pitfalls awaiting the anglophone generativist. He uses English as (a) a meta-theoretical, universal "echelon language" ("the object idiom of general linguistics"), (b) a reference point for the "normal" or "test" situation (e.g. 20-21: "class logic of the feature specificity", cf. also 28; compare the usage of logic and "language philosophy", 118ff.: "The following paradigm of 'John is a man'" is neither a "paradigm", nor a universally observable or definable phenomenon of grammar); (c) an introspective generating implement language; (d) a translation medium of Egyptian and Coptic; (e) a statement medium and (f) a source of comparative illustration. The question is not broached of which diasystem of English is being compared (American? South-Eastern British? Anglo-Irish? Written? Colloquial? The author's?): (61f.) "In English, basically what can be clefted...". In fact, a seemingly innocent "... in English, for example" (104) is a loaded assertion, to be understood quite differently from comparative facts from say, Russian or Arabic or Chinese. And much worse, the structure of Egyptian is tacitly assumed to match that of English (118, where three Egyptian patterns are preanalytically assigned, as precise correspondents, to three English sentences; small wonder they emerge later as "conclusions of the analysis"!).

(f) The theoretical orientation of this monograph is responsible for only some of the flaws in its argumentation; others are simply the result of circular, inverted, question-begging or non-sequential logic. A small sample will suffice. (14) "Coptic may generate a definite article not only to establish identity of reference ... but also to attach a definite article to...". (55-7) First, "obligatory pronominalization"; then, a "corollary principle" that if such does not take place the noun phrase is to be interpreted as a reference to a different entity; then, an "alternative pronominalization" substituting the "antecedent noun" to its pronominal substitute (!); then, a "noun with deictic modifier", again "instead of its substitute". Eventually one wonders what is left of the obligatory pronominalization.

Statements inverting means and end, signal and signalled, *expression* and *contenu*: (45) "Synchronically speaking, *pe/te/ne* are not demonstrative pronouns and cannot be substituted in any demonstrative slot in Coptic (***pe pe prōme)" — as if the rhematic slot were the only one open to demonstratives. (50) "The extraposition of the subject of a nominal sentence is normally motivated by the desire to topicalize it... The subject... is removed from its normal position, brought forward, and an appropriate pronominal copy is left in its place". (57) "The scope of these processes [i.e. of "obligatory pronominalization"] are [sic] notorious for trans-

cending sentence boundaries" — rather, sentence boundaries, never pre-analytically given, are notorious for being transcendable (indeed it is, *inter alia*, the validity of pronominal reference that defines subtextual boundaries)! It is not interrogative pronouns which are "rhetorical" or "nonrhetorical" (80), but rather their construction. (100) "In the sense make/do, the complement is always specific; the complement may be a demonstrative pronoun, an interrogative pronoun..." — in fact, the sense is signalled by the determination and other syntagmatic factors and does not motivate them. Similarly in (101), "Nonspecific (= non-specifying) noun phrases formed the predicates of sentences in which the subject is qualified and described rather than identified".

Circularity: (14) "The copula always agrees with the subject" — but the author also defines the subject (11f.) by this very agreement with the copula! Factual incorrectness: (116) "The bulk of the evidence indicates... that dialectal differences are mainly phonological and lexical rather than morphological or syntactic, at least in the latest phase of the language ... i.e. in Coptic". This is demonstrably untrue, as any scholar with experience of reading in the dialects will confirm, Till's grammar notwithstanding.

Several inaccuracies also characterize the author's observations on nineteenth-century linguistics. (3) "The nature of academic research in 1909" was not at the root of Hermann Paul's concern with Indo-European languages; on the contrary, typological description, comparison or classification, initiated by Humboldt in the eighteenth century, flourished in the nineteenth and early twentieth (A. Schleicher, H. Steinthal, F. Misteli, G. von der Gabelenz, H. Schuchardt, F. N. Finck; most of these scholars made insightful observations to make on Egyptian and Coptic). Hermann Paul, simplistically considered "spokesman of the Neogrammarian doctrine", has been "undeservedly neglected" only by those schools for whom the neglect of early European linguistic scholarship is almost a tenet.

The author's citation of non-occurring or questionable forms, constructions and patterns tell us a good deal about his attitude to textual facts, his carefulness and his *Sprachgefühl*: (43) *anok ouróme pe* — topicalized in the delocutive NS pattern we find only *delocutive* personal pronouns, demonstratives or noun syntagms; *anok ang-* (the topicalized interlocutive pattern, see below, 4[a]) supplies interlocutive topicalization. Similarly (52) *ouróme pe anok* — the satellital position after *pe* is occupied only by a noun syntagm (which lexicalizes *pe* and is a component of a complex theme consisting of the formal mark of thematicity and the noun syntagm) or a demonstrative (SHISHA-HALEVY 1984:183f.); *anok* (or for that matter *ntof*) would not be interpretable as a constituent of the nexus, but as an augens, referable to, and selected by, the subject: *ang-... anok, ... pe ntof. fsótm* "He has been heard", *f-ei, f-bók*, if at all attested (when they would be instances of the "non-actual" or non-durative present) can hardly be considered "quote" forms (26). The unexplained *(t)fnasótm* (95) may represent an opinion about diachrony but is not Coptic. *enef-* (94) is only very doubtfully a Second Tense (the author gives no evidence). I believe the Second Future (in apodoses of remote condition) and Basic Imperfect may share the thematic role between them; exx. in T. Orlandi's *Shenute contra Origenistas*, Rome 1985, p. 16, 60. *enere-* (circumstantial conversion of preterite) in the sense "while/whereas" (113 n. 7, no exx. given) is non-existent; the form expresses only remote condition protasis.

Unsubstantiated or fallacious statements are common: (11) "sentence (14) [*oume pe pšaje etséh*] has practically the same meaning as sentence (3) [*pšaje gar oume pe*]; it is difficult, however, to see why one form was chosen in preference to

another. These two types of sentences would then differ only in the position of the subject ...": the author seems to consider the difference between topicalized theme (3) and lexicalized thematic pronoun (14) to be "practically" negligible, not ruled by the formal/functional opposition factor ("only", of a major tagmemic feature!). The meaning of function and the distinction between variation and alternation occasionally seem to elude him altogether: (19) "The Coptic word for name may be the first or second member, apparently with no difference in function" — *pefran pe X* is a basic, thematic progression, text organizing, existential naming pattern, while *X pe pefran* is the means to express (a) *polemic* or *focal* naming, (b) apocritic naming (a marked response-form to an inquiry about one's name). The author's claim (97) notwithstanding, *eire* can govern "locative" prepositional expressions (e.g. *r-hitpe*, Shenoute ed. Amél. II 192). Callender's *ou pet(t)i-na-aaf* (98, following Till) ignores the basic morphosyntactic effect of converters (Polotsky, *Or* 29:398f., 1960 = *CP* 244f.). (96, 103) "The 'durative tenses' take infinitives (only in their full forms) ... the construct form *r-* of the infinitive of *eire* can occur only with the nondurative tenses": account is not taken of the construct form, which is obligatory with zero determination of the object, as discussed by Jernstedt in 1927 and earlier by Stern, *Grammatik* §§ 238, 332 *sub fin.* (Polotsky, *op. cit.* 401f., *CP* 247f.). Characteristically loose is the following: (123) "Since independent pronouns are normally subjects of nominal sentences, one is reluctant to analyze a pronoun as a predicate nominal" — what about the Participial Statement? What about *ink pw*? What is meant by "normally" and "analytic reluctance"? (136, Ex. 43) *Ppi pwy X - n Ppi is pw Y*, translated "*Piopi* is Thot, *Piopi* is not Seth" (author's italics), whereas the construction rather opposes two rhematic identifications of Pepi, one asserted and the other denied: a clear example of # SUBJECT - copula - PREDICATE #.

   (g) *The author's structuralism*. Here indeed is a morass for the unwary. Like the political economy (to borrow Max Weber's dictum), structural analysis is not a tram which one can get from at will. The seeming structuralisms of this monograph are no more than occasional gestures which do not grow out of theoretical conviction. Some examples. The author's use of "marking": "overt marking" (61) — as opposed to what? Can marking be effected by any means other than a *signifiant*? "Unmarked" (e.g. 43, 157), "more marked" (152) — terms which remain meaningless unless one establishes the binary (privative) opposition and precisely defines the markedness paradigm in question. The present, for instance, is not an "unmarked tense" (61), just as it does not contain a "zero tense-marker" (*pace* Callender, see [h] below); in this case, too, "markedness" can be postulated only following a sound statement of "tense paradigm" for Coptic (the characteristic atemporality or better extratemporality of the conjugation system does not make this task any easier; but this is not a question of markedness in the structural sense).

   Oppositions, observable only between terms of a paradigm — or of its categorial *signifié* —, do not aimlessly hover about in "the language". The author's use of "stand in opposition to" is vitiated by its extension beyond the mere framework of defining grammatical value, that is beyond statements of neutralization *vs.* maintenance of oppositions. How can a linguist claim to offer a genuine reappraisal of Nominal Sentence syntax without a strict account of pattern and pattern constituent opposition or neutralization? The use of "opposition" as synonymous with "distinction" entails such pseudo-statements as (24) "neutralization of the distinction of subject and predicate" or (42, 44) "neutralization of specificity" with "specificity"

not established as a category/paradigm of form and function. Even worse is (68) "neutralization (graphic at least) of two originally different constructions", of *pet-* and *demonstr. + et-* in Sahidic, while *pai et-* and *pe et-* are well attested. Even a copula is said (46) to be neutralized. Similar inaccuracy characterizes the author's use of "privative pairing", e.g. (27) "present" vs. "non-present": this, for example, is in no way a binary privative *ceteris-paribus* opposition. Elsewhere, as in the relation between Cleft Sentences and their "noncleft" counterparts (61ff.), the privative terminology is made to serve the hybrid conception of "synchronic derivation".

This brings us to the author's use of "*paradigm*". The valid definition of structural identity/homonymy is by characterization by the junction of commutability (paradigm) and compatibility (syntagm). The question of "category" and homonymic disparateness is of course crucial in Egyptian, where the absence of vowel graphemes is (analytically speaking) no less than a blessing in disguise, since it frees us of the "superstition de la forme" (de Boer) in judgements of identity and relationship, but it does demand heightened sensitivity to what constitutes an environment. Even where he seems to have the structuralist or tagmemic "paradigm" in mind, the author makes inaccurate or simplistic assertions, e.g. when claiming (187) that certain Egyptian verb-forms (*sdm.f, sdm.n.f, n wnt*) "fail the strict frame definition of an adverbial" by which he means occupancy of the slot following "*iw NP*". The fact is that there are *sdm.f* and *sdm.n.f* forms that are classified (as "circumstantial") and defined by their very privilege of occurrence in that slot; *n wnt* and other negated clause forms occur in other "frames" that are no less "strict" and certainly not secondary. The eventual "category of adverb(ial)" is inevitably synthetic, a cluster of analytic paradigms.

"*Conditioning*" is a case of opposition neutralized, by environmental factor(s), in favour of one or another of its terms, which (paradigmatically) "represents" both (as "allo-form"); the statistical predominance of a construction cannot be "conditioned" (140f.), certainly not by the "lexical meaning" of a constituent element, nor can adverbial expressions occurring in Nominal Sentences be (33) said to be "conditioned in general by the nature of the noun phrases present".

(h) The issue of *zero* in linguistic description — by definition, a structural notion — is difficult (cf. G. F. Meier's *Das Zero-Problem in der Linguistik*, Berlin 1961, an excellent critical appraisal of the *Problematik* involved and research trends). I think, however, it will be agreed that a *sine qua non* for postulating a zero (i.e. "significant absence") entity is the establishment of a paradigm, which, in turn, is environment-dependent. In Coptic, for example, a *zero determinator* is isolable with a noun lexeme as actant of the Tripartite conjugation, a different zero determinator after the existential *oun-/mn-*, but *nihil* after the derivational nuclei *mnt-, at-* etc. In the author's hands — in the generative model, he can "zero" ("delete") almost anything on transit from deep to surface structure – and in the strange twilight zone between synchrony and diachrony, the notion of zero melts into meaninglessness. Some examples: the non-overt copula (145, between two nouns) is presented as the result of a "phonological weakening" of *pw*; it is presumably the same as the "zero copula" (158) resulting from the "disappearance" of *pw*. For the author, a "non-overt" element may be purely synchronic and may even have gender/number categorization and motivate concord (!), as that copula which agrees with the "non overt meteorological subject whose gender and number are the same as those of the predicate" (23). I find even more objectionable the

zero occasionally postulated in the Bipartite Conjugation before the actor prefix as a sort of "zero base" ("*nθssooun an*", 74): this amounts to misuse of the structural paradigm and of the notion of substitution: *(a)-f-sōtm* and *f-sōtm* do NOT belong to a single paradigm — they include two or three variables (pattern, actor-expression, rheme) beside the base; as a matter of fact the rheme opposition is between *a- + sōtm₁*" (Trip.) vs. *sōtm₂*" (Bip.), the latter distinct in its commutability with adverbials and stative. Similarly wrong is the postulation of "two zero morphemes" following the relative pronoun in the Coptic Bipartite (61), indicating "the unmarked tense and third person masculine singular": there is no 'tense' morpheme whatever and no "deleted" resumption of the antecedent in this construction (the evidence of the isolated instances of resumption [SHISHA-HALEVY 1983:314f.] is as yet difficult to evaluate). "Stripped down" (185) is another of the question-begging "zeroes" that are of little descriptive meaning.

(i) *Pattern definition; pattern identity and homonymy.* In a work aiming at pattern classification, the author makes but the most perfunctory gesture towards defining the notion of patterns.

The structural definition of a pattern as "ordered sequence of categories (i.e. paradigms)" seems to me the only alternative to the reductionist approach to this question, which inevitably leads to oversimplification and underresolution. We cannot, for example, be dealing with a single pattern if (7) "the copula can come between them [i.e. two nouns in nexus] ... or after the second member of the equation", or when (156) "the sentences we have just presented have all interchangeable main members", or (19) "in such sentences, the Coptic word for name may be the first or second member, apparently with no difference in function". Pattern underresolution pervades this work: note, for instance, the case of the special pattern *ntof ntof on pe* (42), on which more below.

Unclear usage of this term is frequent: (10) "agreement pattern", "unitary agreement pattern", self-contradicted by "they belong to at least two distinct patterns". "Types of sentences" (11) are presumably synonymous with "patterns". A Nominal Sentence sentence "class" is postulated (12) and subdivided into two "patterns", the first of which has two forms and thus in fact constitutes two disparate patterns in the precise sense of the term: *iōhannēs ourōme pe* and *ourōme pe iōhannēs*, both indifferently translated as "John is a man"; later on (16f.) the second "pattern" is subsumed with the second form of the first under the formal characterization of "sentence medial copula", with the downright contradiction of "what seemed at first a radical difference between the position of the copula at the end of the sentence" (author's syntax) "turns out to be of minor significance" and "it is the position of the copula that is important". Here too we find tautological statements: (10) "nominal sentence with the copula following the second member must have the order subject–predicate nominal–copula".

(j) Of the many objectable terminological points in this book, I shall here refer only to "subject" and "predicate" — not a matter of merely choosing or preferring terms, but fundamental notions of syntax. In a study of predication patterns, "subject" and "predicate" surely deserve more than a footnote (p. 23, n. 3), where the author's definitive reference to the question is relegated, and a brief appendix added, almost as a kind of afterthought (204-7). Let me point out what I see as not mere manifestations of the author's insensitivity to the complexities of this, the

cornerstone of any conceptual framework of syntax, but symptoms of ignorance of what they really mean in and for syntactic analysis.

While maintaining that (24) "the logical categories are redundant as such", "the distinction is otiose", the author still employs them, apologetically: (207) "The use of the terms subject and predicate is not a question of sentimental antiquarianism but a recognition of the necessity of identifying the nodes of these functions in order to formulate rules of pronominalization and congruence". But subject and predicate are not "classificatory criteria" (23), to be relegated to deep structure (207) or a basis to "formulate rules of pronominalization and congruence", but terms in an analytical system, crucial in determining clause and text structure, logical ("information packaging") *as well as grammatical*, with the logical structuring being the *signifié* of the syntagmatic one. In this work, *theme* and *topic* are confused (consider for instance ex. 28, p. 51f.; "already known", "deducible" sum up the author's attention to this aspect of the subject, 78ff.), and so are *rheme* and *focus*. He totally ignores the existence of a double thematic structure expressed by specific syntactic means (i.e. reflected in a syntagmatic structure), an intra-clausal one of theme and rheme and extra-clausal one of topic and focus, the terms of "microsyntactic" clause nexus and "macrosyntactic", information-unit "nexus" respectively. In the discussion of LE *ir-* constructions (137ff., 149f.), while "extraposition" is pointed out, we hear not a word on topicalization (formal marking of the topic as distinct from theme, cf. Halliday's "prominent topic"); while of the functional significance of the Cleft Sentence, that specific focalization pattern so prominent in the study under review, we are only told (79) that it serves for "putting what is already known into the desired focus" — which amounts to a popular definition of subject/predicate that is inadequate and vague.

(k) *The diachronic perspective.* This is not a diachronic study properly speaking, in the sense of synchronies juxtaposed, for no coherent synchronic system is depicted. Reading this monograph, one has a lingering feeling that, the separate headings notwithstanding, the pre-Coptic treatment is in essence what Junge calls "*Gesamtägyptisch*" — a suspicion not allayed by the allotment of one-half of the book to all pre-Coptic phases. The author ignores the well-developed, method-conscious discipline of structural historical linguistics and its main tenet, namely, that scientific diachrony is the chronological confrontation of *categories*, not items, and that "loss" or "disappearance" (words featuring frequently in this study: 151, 158, 165 — patterns disappear, a copula and other morphemes are weakened and "phonologically" lost) mean nothing in this context; what "passes" from one phase into another are not *items* — morphs or patterns (see e.g. 161) — but systemic slots, values or functions of such elements. CHANGE is what is observed and what matters: change in the categorial assignation or value of elements, in categorial structure, or in the overall systemic arrangement. Another flaw of the diachronic statements made here is the equation of "attested" with "existent", perfectly acceptable in a synchronic description (provided a corpus is defined), but inadequate when constructing historical fact. When (63) *auō, mn-* are said to be "of fairly recent origin.... Apparently there has not yet been enough time in Coptic for the combinations with the two Coptic conjunctions to have been welded into expressions with immovable parts under clefting", the whole premise is questionable. (And how can *mn-* be considered "of recent origin", seeing that there is no phase of Egyptian without a prepositional coordinator of nouns?) The junctural implications of this claim are neither followed up nor precisely phrased: "weld" or "immovable

parts" can hardly pass for constituents of a prosodic account. The LE "etymon" of Boh. "temporal" *etafsōtm*, is given (116) as *irt.f sḏm* "when he had heard", which is non-existent; nothing on the synchronic complexity of the merging of Second Perfect, relative perfect and temporal in the Bohairic and other dialects, or on its diachronic implications.

The author's confident speculations on phonetic forms, derivation "events" and relative chronology are entirely unwarranted: (175ff.) "one should perhaps have expected an original **p(aw)i* or the like" (three pages are devoted to the reconstruction of demonstratives etc., the same space that is later almost begrudgingly allotted in an appendix to the issue of subject/predicate terminology, despite the admission that "little can be deduced" and that "the evidence is equivocal"). The author's approach to historical phonology (?) can be deduced from (177) "the distinction in pronunciation in Late Egyptian was not viewed as important enough to receive written representation, although the distinction survived in Bohairic...", "the pronounced form of *pw*", "rewriting of the phonetic descendants of...", and so on; his idea of relative chronology from (162, 164) "repertoire of combinations in the spoken language immediately prior to these changes", "Sometime slightly later", and so on. The pronouncenents on historical syntactic typology are no better. LE *nty ḥr sḏm/nty iw.f ḥr sḏm* are said (182) to have "replaced the obsolete synthetic participle or relative form with the analytic relative construction with *nty*" — as if *nty ḥr sḏm* did not exist in ME, or the imperfective participle were a tense form, or LE did not itself employ a participle. (Why is the relative imperfect future [*ene-na-*] singled out in Coptic as a "genuine synthetic form" [184f.] and not, say, *ene-*, or *ešaf-*? As a matter of fact, the only genuine synthetic relative in Coptic is the preterite relative *er-*.)

2. Three Notes on "Copula"

(a) True to his (modern-western) Eurocentric theoretical orientation and preconceived model, the author confuses *nexus* (i.e. mutual dependence of theme and rheme) with *copula*. His argumentation from Hermann Paul's polemic with Kern (an inner Indo-European controversy, going on in some form even today): is *ist* copula and the following element the predicate, or is *ist* part of the predicate, followed by a "more predicative" constituent, as Kern analyzes? (Kern, I believe, was right, yet his idea but partly understood by Paul, whose forte was not syntactic analysis. See Regula, *Grundlegung und Grundprobleme der Syntax* [Heidelberg 1951] 105.) This, however, is quite irrelevant for Coptic, since, as the author himself points out (23), the copula is not necessarily embodied in a verb — an important Indo-European typological feature that is (as one tends to forget or ignore) definitely isolated in the general typology of languages. (This is an improvement on Callender's definition in his dissertation, 1970:155, where he refers to "sentences whose predicate would otherwise [i.e. without a copula] be something *other than a verb*" [my italics; an enlightening discussion of the Indo-European issue is L. Hjelmslev's "Le verbe et la phrase nominale", in *Mélanges Marouzeau*, Paris 1948, 253-281].) However, the author does adopt Paul's *Verbindungswort* (by "Wort" meaning "(*Form)verb*" or "*Hülle eines Verbs*" — Regula, *Grundlegung* 28) in his own "linking *word*" without taking into account Paul's evident Germanic and Indo-European ethnocentrism in this point, in keeping with the Greek-Latin oriented terminological tradition of "copula". (C. F. Becker's definition of the co-

pula as "Ausdruck der Aussage und der mit der Aussage verbundenen Beziehungs-verhältnisse" is free of this Indo-European bias; see G. Haselbach, *Grammatik und Sprachstruktur*, Berlin 1966, 215.) Moreover, copulas are not only language-specific but also predicate- and pattern-specific, although the author, his definition of 1970: 155 notwithstanding, clearly uses "copula" as a component exclusive to nominal predication, which is strange: surely there are other types of nexus (i.e. of rhemes and themes, including verbal ones), which have their special exponents or *signifiants*. Here is again a trace element of the ingrained ethnocentrism of this guiding theoretical model: in the prevalent Indo-European type, other kinds of nexus are less transparently analyzed as "*theme + copula + rheme*" than the nominal-predicate kind, and therefore all too easily neglected in the ancient and mediaeval syntactic tradition and terminology (the nominal predicate is conventionally treated as a "case of syntax", the verb as "morphology", adverbial predication falls between almost all possible stools). In its *portmanteau* fusing of thematicity, nexal-link marking and pronominalness, OE and ME *iw-* surely qualifies as "copula" for adverbial predication (which is the matrix accommodating almost all "verbal" predicates in these phases of Egyptian).

(b) The author briefly defines or describes the copula in general as a "linking word" (3); in this the element "word" is objectionable, since (1) the copula — "grammatical expression (*signifiant*) of nexal interdependence" — may well be suprasegmental (witness the prosodic weakening of *ang-* as opposed to *anok*, or the relative encliticity of *pe*) or a tagmemic feature of *order* (sequence); the postulated "zeroing" or "non-overtness" of a copula, with attendant speculations on "phonological weakening" and "loss" are therefore flawed (e.g. 145; consider 7.3.6, and see 1(h) above). What can be excused in an outsider's view (Lehmann, *Der Relativsatz*, Tübingen 1984, 304 n. 12, on *ink-*: "das Fehlen der Kopula ist normal") is hard to accept from an Egyptologist. (2) When the link does "reside" in a word or segment, it is in Coptic a component of a *pronominal theme + link "portmanteau"* complex (not a "subspecies of demonstrative pronoun", and not an issue of "morphology" either, 23), and, for the purpose of pattern resolution, their thematicity and pronominalness is more important than their embodying the nexal link: the price paid in this exposition for subsuming all cases of pronominal subject under "COP" is intolerably high: losing sight of their disparate phoric roles and paradigmatic variability properties, which I believe are the best basis for gaining insight into the disparate structures of the patterns (see below). The author's full definition, found in a footnote (p. 23 n. 2), is unilluminating: "a *structure word* that is *indispensable* to forming sentences with predicate nominals. It is expressly denied that such a word is any particular part of speech (scil. a verb) to merit the term. *Morphologically* the copula is a subspecies of demonstrative pronoun"; the three key words underlined here by me beg themselves the question of definition (and why are, according to this definition, the interlocutive themes *ang-/ntk-* not copulas?). I cannot see that any cogent argument is presented to supersede Sethe's view of *pe* as a "demonstrative pronoun subject" (the only flaw the author seems to find in it, namely that it "had already lost its demonstrative pronoun status in old Egyptian and had become a true copula in Paul's sense of an abstract linking word" is not even an argument from history: demonstrative or not, OE/ME *pw* is, for all its immovability, a pronominal subject, expandable by a lexeme or proper name ("*Dmi pw 'Imnt*"); it is compatible with the movable dem. adjective (e.g. CT VI 7, 12b), hence a different entity: but so are the movable Coptic *pe* and the backgrounding

immovable *pe*, or the movable *pe* and the nuclear *pei-* (*pai*). Incidentally, the assertion (151, on LE) "When the subject is a pronominal one, or a vivid and visible nominal one, *ṗȝy/tȝy/nȝy* is used. If the subject is not considered present or visible, the zero copula is used" is unacceptable as a descriptive statement. The first component is tautological ('if the subject is pronominal, a pronominal subject is used'); "vividness and visibility" are hardly functional categories commensurate with pronoun/noun; a "zero copula" for a pattern containing two nouns (as theme and rheme, # *N N* #) cannot be paradigmatically deduced from a pattern with a pronominal theme and nominal or pronominal rheme.

(c) The sixth chapter, on the type of noun predication that employs conjugation forms, introducing "verbal copula" for *r-/ o n-*, is an opportunity missed. The term itself is infelicitous, not only because of the immediate association with an Indo-European-type copula (*esse*) but especially because it obscures the true opposition of *afr-rôme / fo n-rôme* with *ourôme pe*, namely the opposition of *incidental* (circumstance-dependent) *vs. inherent* predication, respectively (cf. the Kantian differentiation between "analytic" and "synthetic" predication: see H. B. Rosén, "Sur quelques types de prédication en indo-européen ancien", in *Étrennes de Septantaine offertes a Michel Lejeune*, Paris 1978, 217-222). The author describes the incidental type as "acquired" (he would have been well advised to treat here the Egyptian "*m* of predication", hidden away among "nonspecific predications", 103ff., where the category is called "role predication"), but translates all clauses (103) "John is a man" ("John is in the status/role of a …" or "John is [now, under present circumstances] a…" is called for). More importantly, the two "nominal" predications are *not* in complementary distribution (97, another of Callender's pseudo-structuralisms), but in full sharp opposition: the *r-/ o n-* construction does not supply the Nominal Sentence with tense-characterization, but predicates a noun in a nexal affirmation that is circumstance-referable and tense-referable). Indeed, this opposition often resolves lexemic polysemy (or rather signals the selection of one of two homonyms): *shime* ("wife" vs. "woman", e.g. 2 Reg. 14:24), *parthenos* ("chaste" vs. "young woman, maid" (e.g. *Or* 44:154 and 2 Reg. 13:2, respectively) — the former incidental, the latter inherent. (A comparison with spanish *ser* vs. *estar* or Irish # *is* + PRON./NOUN + PRON./NOUN # vs. # *tá se* + ADV. # would here be apposite). Secondly, a golden opportunity is here missed for precising and defining the paradigmatic/syntagmatic disparity-of-identity of the two *r-* (not two *eire*) lexemes: one (*afr-rro/fo nrro*) nucleus of the incidental predication of a noun, the other (*afr-nobe/fr-nobe*) a nuclear "word-formative" prefix for deriving denominative verbs.

3. Notes on Noun Determination. "Specificity"

(a) "Noun phrase" ('NP', alternating with plain "noun") as code-word and notion is a synthetic pseudo-term, referring to no analytically meaningful word-class. Now that the subtle interdependence between the lexical and grammatical structuring of lexemes begins slowly to dawn on grammarians, 'NP' (esp. in a quest of predication grammar such as the present one) is nothing but a blank tombstone on a common grave of analytic sensibilities. True, definite noun lexemes may overlap with proper names in certain environments, but surely more important by far and (descriptively speaking) more interesting are the cases of syntagmatic/para-

digmatic divergence, in compatibility and commutability. To name but a few, selected from those currently investigated by the reviewer in a monograph on the syntactic signalling of the Coptic proper name: privileges of occurrence as theme/rheme in Egyptian and Coptic nexal patterns; text-grammatical issues of naming and generally name-occurrence in narrative and dialogue, their subcategories and substructures; proper-name signalization — how does Coptic/Egyptian, and language in general, signal the degree of properness of an element? In view of the primacy of the proper name, long ago realized by the Stoic school of grammar but since misrepresented in the Dionysian tradition informing our own, there is some subtle historical justice in the generativist use of the schematic "John" (here *iōhannēs*") to represent the whole 'NP' class (7, 12, 119 etc.).

The befogging effect of oversynthesis is even graver in the case of pronouns, admitted by the author to be eligible as predicates but rejected by him (in his very first footnote, p. 22) since they present "conceptual and methodological problems involved in treating the first and second persons in what is otherwise [!?] a third person system of grammatical description" and on the grounds that for pronouns "otherwise regular agreement rules do not always apply"; *tant pis*, I should say, for such "system of grammatical description" and such "agreement rules". Pronouns are indeed a mixed bag in syntactic properties; but that is just why coming to terms with them must be preliminary to any examination of the noun syntagm (= nuclear *determinator pronoun* + lexeme) and the NS (in reality, "Pronominal Sentence": see below). The author must apparently be reminded that nouns (or pronouns, or proper names, or, for that matter, any word-class) are not "given" as prefabricated building-blocks of patterns, any more than patterns themselves as constituents of texts, but rather are signalled and defined as "what they are", functionally speaking, by their environment. At the very least, he ought to have defined his terms (cf. Lehmann's careful terminological delimitation, *Relativsatz* 43ff.).

(b) It is incredible that the author believes it possible to deploy the notion of "specificity" as a pivotal thesis, as a key to the mystery of the synchrony and diachrony of the NS, without first recognizing and squarely coming to grips with the issue of noun determination. This is the subject I find most conspicuously missing from this book; it is a matter of fact that we do not know, by the end of the book, anything new about either determination or its "specificity" component as a phenomenon of Coptic/Egyptian grammar. It must be stressed over and over again, in the face of pervasive Eurocentrism, that *noun* determination is not synonymous with "article". Determination is rather a syndrome or cluster of overlapping or transecting categories, consisting of such true dichotomic or scalar-gradual categories as specificity, number, locatedness and possessedness. Indeed, I find noun determination equals *nominal syntax*, the "nominal condition". The existence of an article in a language is not universal, not even "normal", statistically speaking, and does not warrant an article-language's eye-view of determination. Signalization (and grading) is here the only thing to watch for. Moreover, the articular system of English — far from being "natural" or "universal" (whatever that may mean) — ought not to be imposed on Coptic or Egyptian; which is precisely what we witness in this monograph.

(c) The author's conception of the syntagmatics and paradigmatics of the determinator system of any phase of Egyptian is too superficial for words. I have in the past years attempted to show, following Jernstedt, that the Coptic determinators are *nuclear* in their nous syntagms, and thus (like the "pro-verbs", alias "conjugation

bases", grammatically primary. The noun enters *la parole* (and textual grammar), is *actualized*, "by courtesy" of the pronoun; the pronoun (and the proper name) are not "poor relations" of the noun, but primary to it: "the structure which informs all" is in Coptic the expansion of a nuclear "actualizator" grammeme by a lexeme. It follows that the Nominal Sentence is a "pronominal sentence", predicating the determinator and not the lexeme as such. Unless one realizes this, it is easy, for example, to misconstrue the precious evidence of Shenoute Leip. III 57 ("equating two separate and discrete entities with each other", i.e. "the Church with a number of entities many of which are masculine", 9) where in reality "someone/something *with the nature of...*" is predicated; or to misanalyze the patters *teprō te* (85ff.), in which the pronominal theme *pe*, here truly formal, is anaphoric to, and in concord with the *definite article* (see below).

(d) The author tacitly assumes — and then states as a conclusion (133) — that the value system of "specificity"/"deixis"/determination" is one and the same along the of history of Egyptian. Although some diachronically biased mention is made of articles (189 "in earlier stages [which?] of Egyptian no indefinite article exists", or reporting, 178f., after Kroeber, on "the rise and spread of the article"; or, 133, "the secondary [!] features of definite and indefinite articles characteristic of the later linguistic phase"), the real issue, namely the signalization by environmental factors of different grades and components of the determination syndrome in an article-less language is wholly ignored (143 "the formal signalling devices [are] all the more important in distinguishing specific from non-specific predication" is very true, but never followed up in this book). Although we hardly expect here a comprehensive treatise on noun syntax, it is surely not too much to ask, in a work in which noun "specificity" is the core of the argument, for a preliminary statement of the problem and its implications, perhaps even a few hints at a structural resolution. There is, for instance, not so much as a word on the fact that ME "*snt*" and "*sn*" are not lexemes but *syntagms*, with a suffixed nucleus; nor on the true grammatical significance of an emerging article; nor on LE (145ff.) or Dem. determination (the obvious determination idiosyncrasies of some sets of exx. [e.g. Nos. 119-123] go unheeded).

(e) "Specificity", the core thesis and single criterion for pattern evaluation and classification, is as presented not a concept of grammatical phenomenology, let alone a category (*signifié*) expressed by specific grammatical means (paradigm *signifiant*). We witness here a violation of L. Hjelmslev's two first "illegitimacies" of grammatical description (*La catégorie des cas*, Aarhus 1935, I 90f.): "[it is illegitimate] to impose on the language a set of categories which has not been established intra-linguistically" and "to impose on the language a logical analysis of judgement". The following nearly exhaustive collection of the author's affirmations on the subject of specificity will illustrate the opacity of this concept:

Specificity is "referential", 118, "logical concept", "logical situation", 10, 194; "of/denoted by the predicate nominal", 118, 194 or "of a noun phrase", 13, 101; a "feature" 20, 194 — of the nominal predicate, of the sentence, of Coptic or of "universal logic"? The proviso (5) "It must be remembered that the predicate nouns themselves are not specific or non-specific in any logical sense, but rather specificity is a property of the entities they denote" confuses rather than enlightens, and conflicts with most of the subsequent assertions regarding this "feature".

Specificity "determines the form and structure of sentences with predicate nom-

inals" (118). It is only once described as gradient (118, "degree of ref. sp."), but elsewhere treated as dichotomous. It is (101) linguistically expressed by referring to (the specific noun phrase) with the definite article or demonstrative pronoun ('this man'); its distinction is "basically" (194) "one of whether a predicate nominal refers to an individual in the world that is so defined as to preclude any mistake in identification. If such an individual exists then one is dealing with a predicate nominal that is specific in its reference. If not, then predicate nominal denotes no real entity but rather stands as the representative of a class".

Specific are: (61) (a first noun in a Cleft Sentence, in the case of) "lack of correspondence with the indefinite nouns translating Greek predicate adjectives" (strange as a formal criterion); (100) "a demonstrative pronoun or an interrogative pronoun, inherently treated as specific"; (101) "a noun phrase that denotes a definite individual, potentially nameable, who exists in the universe of discourse".

Non-specific are: (10): "these (predicate nominals) that do not refer to specific individuals in the universe of discourse with whom the subject is being identified. Rather they symbolize a class and such constructions serve to classify the subject or describe it rather than to identify two separate and discrete beings"; (a predicate nominal that is) "descriptive and qualifying"; (13) "Noun phrases with the indefinite article or the definite article followed by some explanatory phrase"; (101) the "abstract representative of a class rather than a specific being in the world... It is usually introduced by the indefinite article and can be preceded only by the definite article as a result of a following modifying phrase".

I shall not dwell on the "English-logic" excurse on "class logic of the feature specificity", which is irrelevant as grammar and, I suspect, naive even as "philosophy of language". Let me just point out the persistent use of such expressions as "inherently treated as", "the world", "universe of discourse", "symbolize", "situation", all unmistakable signs of descriptive bankruptcy, at least where basic grammatical structure is concerned. And indeed, in the doubtful light of this notion (for we never get much beyond this) no sharp details of nominal syntax are seen to emerge. In the absence of a strict, stipulative definition, the author fails in my opinion to make any sort of case for "specificity" as a key factor in pattern definition.

(f) What the author does not seem to realize about the determinators as markers, about morphemes and grammar in general, is that the value of grammatical elements is signalled by opposition (paradigm), and syntagmatic compatibility (including textual reference-signals): "Tout fait linguistique est un fait de valeur et ne peut pas être défini que par sa valeur. Un fait linguistique se définit par la place qu'il occupe dans le système et cette place lui est assignée par la valeur" (Hjelmslev, *La catégorie des cas*, 20). Thus, *pnobe* can well be generic ("Sin"), and *ounobe* specific "a certain sin"; *nobe nim* can mean "every/any sin" (non-specifying quantifier) or "all sins" (specifying totalizing determinator), according to its syntax; even the demonstrative determinator *pi-* can in Sahidic be non-specifying (in its affective role, *pinobe* "such a terrible sin" or [plural, *ni-*] in its generic one, following *nthe* "like"), and *zero* as a *Nennform* "lexeme or notion name", specific: *nobe pe penran, rōme an* (Shenoute RE 10 161b 28f.). Similarly, in the absence of the indefinite article, the zero following *r-* and *o n-* (101f.) is different from the zero in the case of a full commutation, since the paradigms are disparate; so are the few cases of *p(ef-)* in that environment (*r-pefjoeis/o mpefjoeis*), which are notionally not definite.

In view of the above, it will not come as a surprise that many of the designations of predicates in this exposition as specific or non-specific are forced, sometimes improbable: *pnoute* "indefinite specific" (61), personal pronouns "treated as nonspecific predicate nominal" (meaning "he and no other"), even "*m* of predication" with such predicatives as in example 34 (p. 126) or Urk. IV 651.10 (*m nỉ n ḫrw*), or the chart-example (*m tỉy.i grpt*). Likewise, most of the (translating) interpretation of exx. as specific or non-specific are subjective and contestable (e.g. the LE and Demotic ones on pp. 112, 114, 137-146, 154).

4. Pronouns, Phoricity and Nominal Sentence Patterning

"Pronominalization" is inevitably the author's conceptual framework for judging the grammatical operativity of pronouns (already bedevilled by the use of the difference-obliterating overheat-term "COP"). Quite apart from the fact that a process (other than that of linear textual evolution) is out of place in an evaluation of structure, here as elsewhere, it is this of all instances of dynamism from which the description suffers most acutely, in terms of missing the descriptive point and losing sight of priceless hints of structure. (I fail to see how the essentially static concept of "agreement" and "congruence" can be reconciled with "pronominalization"; "equi-noun phrase anaphora", said [49] to be a "general principle of pronominalization" and "forwards/backward pronominalization" [e.g. 50, 59] show how the generative analysis tries to have it both ways: both "pronoun *derived* from noun" and "pronoun referring to noun"/"pronoun representing noun"). In fact, it is the differences in reference-dependence of the pronominal theme-component of the "pronominal sentence" (as statable in terms of signalization) that define the disparity in Nominal-Sentence pattern sets and "sets of sets" and in the structure of subpatterns, and thus prove to be a key classification factor.

Examining the two syntactic positions primary in a two-member nexal construction — the thematic and the rhematic paradigms — we observe relations of compatibility (or its negation, mutual exclusion) and commutability that ostensibly hinge on the thematic pronominal constituents — not surprisingly, since pronouns are grammatically primary to noun syntagms, themselves text-incorporated by their indispensable determinator nucleus, and since it is the theme, not the rheme that contains in Coptic the grammatical apparatus and marker of nexus and predication. The distinction of *interlocutive* and *delocutive* pronouns is fundamental, in Coptic as in other languages:

(a) The *interlocutive* personal pronouns (non-phoric, highly specific, and in a sense the only true personal pronouns) are marked for thematicity (in Sahidic) by a special morphological form that is prosodically opposed to their lexemic (and rhematic) one: *ang-* (vs. *anok-*), *ntk-* (vs. *ntok*) and so on (in other dialects, these two forms fall together in the orthography, but are still distinct in junctural properties. It is the prosodic imbalance between theme and rheme that constitutes the copula in these patterns). In their turn, they define their own ("interlocutive") predicative pattern, in their incompatibility with proper names (in the broad structural sense, including the zero-determinated lexemes as "notion names" or generic names) and their almost constant paradigmatic companions, personal and demonstrative pronouns. (This is a case of mutual exclusion, significant systemic non-attestation, and not of "awkward sequence", *pace* Callender 52.) Of the interrogatives, only *nim*

"who" is compatible with the interlocutive subject-pronouns (hence *ntk-ouou* "What are you?" e.g. Shenoute Chass. 20 or Wess. 9 171c with an obligatory, uncommutable and therefore non-pertinent and unmeaning indefinite article); indefinites and number-names are likewise excluded, but the possessive pronoun *pa-* is not. The interlocutive Nominal Sentence pattern, # *ang-*... #, beside being restricted and marked for dialogue textemes, is 'in macrosyntactic terms "active" only through its *rheme* (*oua* "one" resuming the indefinite *ou-* [2 Cor. 11:22] etc.); it is drastically restricted in rheme constituency, a restriction which makes it more "grammaticalized" (in the sense of "less freely variable") but has nothing to do with specificity as the author understands it: *ang-ouponēros nrome* "I am an evil man" (Shenoute Leip. III 123), *ntetn-pōtn an* "you (pl.) are not yours" (Shenoute Wess. 9 118a).

(b) We find in Coptic no thematic delocutive personal pronouns (the rhematic ones, *ntof* etc., are in reality pronoun lexemes). We do have, however, gender/number-movable demonstratives (*pe/te/ne*) that are thematic (marking the slot preceding them in a nexal pattern as rhematic) as well as potentially phoric. These define a "delocutive" Nominal Sentence pattern set, unrestricted in rheme constituency, one that is distinct in syntactic and prosodic structure as well as in its distribution, macrosyntactically functional yet textemically unmarked for dialogue or narrative. While these pronouns may, in a conveniently inaccurate synthesizing sense, be said to belong to a single suppletive "notional" paradigm with the interlocutives, pattern (b) does NOT constitute a paradigm with pattern (a) (*pace* Callender 41) since the case does not satisfy the neutralization of opposition that is the basic condition of suppletivity: several *differentiae specificae* keep the two patterns distinct. (NB: the grammatical rheme is here either a pronoun: personal, demonstrative, interrogative or indefinite, or a determinator: demonstrative, possessive, definite, indefinite or zero, all nuclei of their noun syntagms.) Now it is this very set of reference functions, defining several subpatterns interrelated in a paradigm of endotextual-reference roles, that is totally obscured by the compound effect of seeing *pe/te/ne* as "COP" and as the end-product of a dynamic derivative process.

The following sketch (schematic and over-simplifying, exceptions as regards concord being mostly encountered in the case of personal-pronoun themes: *ousōma nouot pe anon tērn*, 1 Cor. 10:17, or *tenepistolē ntōtn pe*, 2 Cor. 3:2) tentatively classifies and defines of NS patterns according to theme phoricity:

(b₁) ## [.....] # RHEME *pe* #: here *pe* (and the pattern itself) is *anaphoric* to a non-topicalized (pro)noun preceding in the text, this being signalled by the concord of the (pro)noun and of the theme *pe*: *ourasou nak pe eknkotk auō pekmokmek pe ekrēs* "It (i.e. gold) is a dream for you when sleeping and your preoccupation when awake" (Shenoute Amél. II 531).

(b₂) # [TOPIC] RHEME *pe* # is a prominent-topic construction, its topic, extraposed to the *rheme + pron. theme* anaphoric pattern, typically repeating a *prius dictum* (or *prius notum*) (pro)noun and resumed by the pronominal theme (as signalled by their concord): *pesoou pa-nethērion an pe* "The sheep, it does not belong to the wild beasts" (Shenoute Leip. III 47).

(b₃) # [DETERMINATOR + *lexeme*] – *pe* #: a pattern of great importance, in which the pronominal theme is anaphoric to *the definite determinator*. The theme is empty, a "dummy" slot-filler, formal constituent (not backgrounding or exophoric, representing "the situation", *pace* Callender 23), indeed a mark of the preceding segment's rhematic status. The pattern is functionally and to a degree formally com-

parable with the Indo-European "*subjektlose Verba*", Brugmann's "*freie Impersonalien*", in which the formal theme ("it", "*es*") is neither commutable with or referent to any lexeme and is thus paradigmatically as well as macrosyntagmatically inert; even the definite determination, standing as it does in this pattern out of opposition to other grades, is here of no pertinence. (Incidentally, L. Stern saw this essential functional equivalence, *Grammatik* § 301.) In terms of textual juncture, the pattern is a *delimitation*. It is true that this pattern is used to predicate "meteorological" expressions, "phenomena of time and nature", "time word predicate nominals" (Callender 85ff.): *pšōm pe, teprō te* "it is summer", "it is winter" (Shenoute Leip. IV 110, 111); but its rheme constituency is by no means restricted in this way. Thus we have *thaē te* (Shenoute Chass. 23), with an anaphoric negatived sequel *entos an pe* "It is the end... it isn't" (on which see more below); or *tanankē te etre...* "it is imperative that..." (Shenoute Leip. III 25).

However, this pattern's special importance is in its being (in a relative-like conversion-form, which occurs however, regardless of antecedent determination or even the existence of an antecedent, as a *hermeneia*-initial mark) the hermeneutical construction *par excellence*: *ete-niaretē ne, ete-piepiskopos pe, ete-martha te, ete-tipsukhē te* and so on (all taken from Catena 142, also 253, 200, 205 — the form of *pe/te/ne* selected by the def. determinator, not by the antecedent, if any), and in its being, in all probability, the nucleus pattern in some Cleft Sentence constructions in Coptic (see below).

(b₄) # RHEME *pe* [*N*] #: *pe* CATAPHORIC, the noun syntagm "lexicalizing" the pronoun which functions as a "provisional" formal subject explicitated by the extraposition. The noun is here a lexical component of a complex theme, in which the formal ("grammatical") component marks thematicity: *pai pe pnoute mme* "THIS is the true God" (Shenoute Chass. 83), *henhap ne neišaje ehrai ejōn* "These words are judgements [or: "condemning"] upon us" (Shenoute Amél. II 32).

Two constructions, probably to be assigned as sub-forms of this pattern, must still be further studied: (1) the case of the pronominal theme — cataphoric or endophoric? — *expanded by a clause*, which is marked as noun-syntagm equivalent by *je-*, *etre-* (also the conditional or circumstantial): *oumntasebēs te etre-* (Shen. contra Origenistas 60); (2) the case of the zero-determinated rheme, with the lexemic theme usually an infinitive ("*hote pe joou*"): rheme proper-name equivalent, theme invariable?

(b₅) # THEME – *pe* – RHEME #: another important pattern, for which many details regarding dialectal distribution, constituent determination, constituency, internal structure convertibility and macrosyntactics are still wanting. It is probably the main casualty of this study's analytic fuzziness and another golden opportunity lost (exx. 15 on p. 10, 31-4 on p. 18, 35 and 37 on p. 19 all belong here). It may be negatived (*pace* Callender 18): *peunoute an pe iēsous*, Shenoute Chass. 100f. The "medial" *pe* in this pattern qualifies as "copula" (the "natural" sequence "theme to rheme", peculiar to this pattern in Coptic and its Egyptian correspondent, makes here an Indo-European-style analysis especially tempting). It is prosodically distinct from the preceding pattern, as evident from the very considerable potential expansion of the subject preceding *pe* and the recurring punctuation "*theme. pe rheme*", e.g. in 1 Reg. 14:50 Drescher, which may mean that the pronoun-copula is here cataphoric. Its macrosyntactic specifics are no doubt what marks it in opposition to (b₄): its theme being cotext-bound, it most characteristically functions as link in

a thematic progression, a fact which makes it especially prevalent in metaphrastic (hermeneutical) textemes: *tnoune nanomia nim pe pcol* "The root of all iniquity is falsehood" (Shenoute Amél. II 494) (*nim pe pai* "Who is this?) — *pai pe paulos* "This is Paul" (Shenoute Leip. IV 198), *tkhōra gar mpidiabolos pe tetphō tērs nni-pathos* "The Devil's country is the entire burden of desires" (Catena 158), *tsouri gar mpmou pe phnobi phnobi je oun pe pdiabolos* "Death's sting is sin; and sin is the Devil" (ibid. 212; note that *gar* is a delimiting signal, marking the opening of the *sorites* chain, of which *je-oun* is an internal link marker).

(c) The formation # PRONOUN – (*invariable*) *pe* # *"anok pe"* (etc.) features in a set of patterns, the details of which are as yet not entirely clear. I propose the following tentative functional range:

(1) In *identitive* textual status: all persons (cf. French *c'est moi*):

    (a) Apocritically dependent, anaphoric to a rhematic pronoun+proper-name referent; answering "Is it you, X?" as the Coptic "yes, it is" (Gen. 27:24, 2 Reg. 2:20, 9:2 (?, v.l. *anok*), 20:17; also Joh. 6:20, with the question implied. Greek ἐγώ or ἐγώ εἰμι).

    (b) Apocritically dependent, anaphoric to the nexus with a proper-name rheme; answering "Are you X?", as the Coptic "yes, I am": Mc. 14:62, Lc. 21:8; the question implied in 1 Reg. 9:19, Lc. 21:8, 24:39, Catena 214. Greek ἐγώ εἰμι (αὐτός).

    (c) Dependent, in a glossing identification (*ete-nthok pe, ete-nthōten-0,* Catena 11, 144); cf. *oushime ete-ntos on pe maria* (Shen. contra Origenistas 30).

(2) Dependent, anaphoric to a rhematic *definite* noun syntagm: all persons? (cf. French *je le suis*): (Shenoute Or 44:157, 1975) (they say: *tape nteshime pe peshai*) *auo ntof name pe* "and he is" (read *pe,* not *me*). Also (negatived and circumstantial) Shenoute Chass. 23 (anaph. to *thaē*), Joh. 13:13 (*psah, pjoeis*), 1 Joh. 3:1 (*nšere mpnoute*). The Greek has here (καί) εἰμι (γάρ), marked for retrodependence, with the predicative ἐγώ absent. (1 Cor. 9:2 [*tesphragis...*] is not a case of "agreement rules not applying" [23 n. 1] or "the speaker confused [!] by the unexpected pronominal predicate", which, after all, he himself has just uttered.)

(3) "Independent", *existential*:

    (a) the "theological" existential claim ("I am what I am", or in the "vital" nuance of existence, see Charles H. Kahn, *The Verb 'be' in Ancient Greek,* Dordrecht-Boston 1973, 234f.). Interlocutives only? Greek ἐγώ εἰμι: Deut. 32:39; (Joh. 8:58, Boh.) *mpate-abraam šōpi, anok pe* (Sah. A² *tišoop*); Joh. 8:24 (*anok pe* eliciting the question "who?");

    (b) other cases: Ruth 3:10 *petentof pe* "whoever it be" (no equivalent in the Greek); Act. 5:36, Gal. 2:6, 6:3 "I am sombody" (i.e. important), Greek εἶναί τι.

(4) The existential *anok pe* with adverbs of time (*nsaf, mpoou, šaeneh;* cf. Kahn's "lasting existence", *op. cit.* 233, 237f.): Jes. 46:4, with NT (Heb. 13:8) and post-scriptural (Chass. 63f.) variations.

(5) The same (?), with the pronoun reiterated (the rheme being "*ntof ntof*" etc.) and the pattern usually including *on* "still" and a noun syntagm extraposed (topicalized) or (rarely) appositive to *pe:* expressing *immutability.* See SHISHA-HALEVY 1984:186 (add. exx.: *nthof nthof pe paicōis nouōt* Catena 230, *iēsous pekhristos nsaf mn-poou ntof ntof on pe* Morgan 575 12vo = *Apa Mena* [ed. Drescher] 176, *ntau ntau tērou ne* NHC I 61vo = Tract. Trip. 122; note the relative form,

proving the first pronoun not topical, in *na-torgē ete ntoou ntoou on ne* [*ne* ed.; I suspect *pe*] Guérin, *Sermons inédits de Šenouti,* 16b). *peioeik mn-peiērp nsaf ntof on pe mpoou* "That bread and that wine of yesterday, it is still the same today" (Kuhn, *Mus.* 96:254, 1983) appears to be a case of transition between functions (4) and (5).

(6) Finally, cases of *anok pe* (*pe* invariable or variable) anaphoric to (or rather apocritically dependent on) certain Cleft Sentence pattern; here, for once, we find the construction negatived, albeit in a rhetorical "nonne" question: *nim pentaftamioou nangelos mpneuma me ntof an pe auō perfeiōt* "Who created them (as) angels of light, is it not He and His Father? (Shen. contra Origenistas 22), *nim pentafaas mē ntōtn an pe* "Who did it, is it not you? (ibid. 32), *ntoou name ne* "(and) they are indeed", referable back to *mmonakhos netēp er-nēsteia* "it is the monks that are supposed to fast" (Shenoute Chass. 102).

* *

The author avers (123) that pattern (b₁) must be "derived" from (b₄) — "one can transformationally derive a simpler form from a more complex one, but not conversely", and argues, rather dimly, that "a pronominalized form can be predicated in principle for any given noun in isolation, but a noun cannot be predicated from a given pronoun in isolation". Were we to divest this last assertion from its doctrinaire jargon ("pronominalized form" = "pronoun", "predicate... from" = "predicate... of"), and leave out the incomprehensible "in isolation" (we are after all not dealing with "zero-context", but with constituents of a text; indeed, "predication in isolation" is almost a contradiction in terms), we would be left with a veritable non-statement: in Coptic *all* formal themes are pronominal, and thus the only way to predicate a (pro)noun of a noun is by mediation of a pronoun, which may be "lexicalized" by an appositive noun syntagm (b₄); however, a pronoun may be rhematic — indeed, it is arguable that all rhemes of "Nominal Sentences" in Coptic are pronominal in one sense or another.

5. The Cleft Sentence

The only subject in which the study under review is at least conducive to discussion, is that of the structure and function of the Cleft Sentence (CS). Let me preface a very brief discussion of this with three research-historical observations. First, a matter of sentimental interest: generativists reflecting on "clefting" should find a soft spot in their heart for Coptic. I may be wrong, but my impression is that the attention of the generative school was drawn to this construction by a single lecture of Polotsky on the Coptic/Egyptian CS in MIT, February 1960 (see Lees' article in the *Zeitschrift für Phonetik,* in this book referred to as Lees 1963). Secondly: "Polotsky 1962" is by no means Polotsky's first or most informative treatment of this pattern: the second of the *Études de syntaxe copte* (1944), §§ 18ff. (= *CP* 158ff.) is no doubt the most detailed treatment (of terminology, structure, distribution, function and typological-comparative aspects), but we find the French construction comparatively referred to as early as 1937 (*GLECS* 3:1ff.). A detailed treatment of this construction by Polotsky, in the context of the Second Tense and relative conversion in general is in the press. Thirdly, a point of definitive termi-

nology: "cleft" and "clefting" as used in this book (and by the generative school, to approximate "focussing" — as if this were the only means of focalization) are almost depleted of their special meaning. In its broad comparative application (as against the narrow, North-West European original one), a Cleft Sentence ("phrase coupée", "Spaltsatz") is a clause in which the theme (in this case, = topic, *glose* in Damourette-Pichon's terminology) is itself a (sub)nexus, especially verbal, usually marked as thematic (most typically by nominal characteristics) but sometimes un-marked — when other tagmemic features carry the burden of marking. The rheme (in this case, = focus) is *not* an unmarked nexus.

(a) *Internal structure.* While it is true that the coptic CS is not entirely trans-parent in structure (POLOTSKY 1962:430 = *CP* 435 admits the difficulty of its synchronic analysis), this is hardly an acute analytic quandary: the question of com-ponent "identity" (of *p(e)*, for instance) must be rephrased as one of constituent signalling, and the question of pattern function or "value" as one of opposi-tion/neutralization (conditioning) and compatibility. The one analytic fact that is perfectly clear, in immediate-constituent terms, is that the relative does NOT ex-pand the focus; the focus is not the antecedent or nucleus of the relative. They belong rather to two different constituents of the nexus (no one to my knowledge claims it is a "third autonomous member", *pace* Callender 185), viz. rheme (focus) and theme (relative verb with or without a preceding formal pronominal theme). The author contests this for Coptic and Egyptian, in my opinion with not even the makings of a serious argument; he argues from the "logical structure" (189f.), which I shall but mention here, seeing how irrelevant the premises and way of thinking of "Anglo-universal" logic — very superficially represented in the discussion — are for the grammatical reality of Coptic/Egyptian nexal constructions: "The initial element is a subset (even if coextensive) of the set of objects designated by the relative clause. We should expect exactly the opposite state of affairs if the set designated by the relative clause were indeed the subject, since the subject set of a nominal sentence is the subset of the predicate set" can on no account be considered an adequate description of the differential semantic structure of, say, *tape nteshime pe peshai* "A woman's head is her husband" or *legeōn pe paran* "L. is my name" as against *prro pentafouehsahne* "It is the King who commanded". Of the truly deci-sive text-functional issues involved, namely the Functional Sentence Perspective and Communicative-Dynamism rating of the construction in question, no mention is made, as if "subject" and "predicate" were simple isolated notions, absolute of context. (Incidentally, there is no difficulty to translate the relative "as subject" into Western languages; but even if there were, this would be irrelevant as internal evidence, being a matter of the language-specific role or value of the pattern.) The only *formal* argument presented, namely (190) the "inability of using a relative clause without an article as subject" does not apply to Old/Middle Egyptian, where the nucleus of the relative/participle is the infixed gender/number marker (the claim that in Egyptian "things are arbitrarily referred to with the feminine form... we should expect feminine subject relative forms with masculine predicate nominals" is entirely wrong. The "neutric feminine" is one of several possible nuclei, signalling a concord delimitation, or non-concord, or exophoric gender marking, as the case may be, but this has little to do with the CS as such); it is, however, easily answered in Coptic. Like the appositiye lexical subject in the # PREDICATE – *pe* – SUBJECT # Nominal Sentence pattern (our pattern b₄ above), the relative does not in most cases constitute in itself the theme of the CS, but is a component thereof,

preceded (again, like the appositive lexical subject in b₄), by the formal theme-marker *pe*. This does leave us with the # FOCUS – *et*– # pattern (on which more below), in which the relative *must* be interpreted as thematic (non-adjunctal), seeing that the focus is in this case never eligible as nucleus (antecedent) for a relative conversion-form; indeed, I suspect this is the reason for the absence of the nexus marker *pe*.

All problems "of a syntactic sort" (65) ensuing from the author's proposed analysis of the relative as adjunctal to the focus are pseudo-problems; e.g., the case of an indefinite focus and the inevitable way out by an ad-hoc postulation of an "overrule" (188) or a "non-relative" *ete*– (65), both seeming no less than admis-sions of descriptive failure.

(b) *The relationship of CS questions and pronominal-theme answers*: Quite apart from the spurious use of "derivation" in this context (see above, 1[d]), this matter, central in the author's argument, calls for some attention: (4, 69) "Similar structural relations exist within cleft sentences and nominal sentences, as answers to questions generally maintain the modality of the question"; (84) "Answers to cleft questions are cleft answers ['cleft' here = focusing], albeit stripped of their relative clauses and even, potentially, of the copula". Even if the claim regarding "modal-ity" (illustrated by an English example of *tense* assymetry between Q. and A., on which judgement is passed as "ungrammatical, i.e. contextually bizarre") were true, this statement would still be a *non sequitur*, since "modality" (whatever this vague concept may mean, in terms of grammar) has no direct bearing on syntagmatic structure (the author admits as much on p. 82; yet, as it happens, even the modality claim is wrong for real language). The attempt to reconstruct the precise *form* of a question from its answer in real discourse is doomed to failure, as has been long ago realized by students of general syntax; this is a distinctive trait of the dialogue, in which pragmatics and "context" (as against "cotext") play a decisive role and the relative looseness of the formal texture is very striking.

When the author goes on to postulate (87) "a cleft original" for the "meteoro-logical" sentence (*teprō te* "It is winter"), he turns the issue upside down. This, taken together with (75) "Cleft sentences are derived from their non-cleft counter-parts", muffles the whole issue up in a smoke-screen of utter confusion. (Much more accurate is the statement for ME, which conflicts however with his general thesis: [161] "Cleft sentences in Middle Egyptian are patterned after sentences with pronominal subjects by extending them with a relative construction" — "patterned after", not "derived"; "pronominal subject", not "copula"; "extending them" — the sentences or the subjects? — rather than extending the nominal predicate).

The author's whole thesis is in fact founded on the assumption that the "*N pe*" pattern in responses faithfully reflects the structure of the Cleft-Sentence interroga-tive allocution. As suggested, this claim (as phrased in general terms) is simplistic. The pattern typically answering Cleft Sentence questions is not the cotext-anaphoric *N pe* (our b₁) pattern, but the one with the formal "endophoric" theme (our b₃), in which the theme is anaphoric to this nuclear determinator. (This is apparently the Coptic answer to a "noun only" response in other languages. While it is true there are cases of *zero theme* [for Bohairic, see SHISHA-HALEVY 1981:328f.], this does not seem to extend across the allocution — response delimitation.) Here the equivalent of a zero theme is a zero-function theme, namely the one that is there as a mere slot-filler. (The one example of a "noun only" response [82 No. 45, Rom. 8:34] does not quote the whole response, which is much longer [*pekhristos pentafmou*

nhouo de pentaftōoun ebol hnnetmoout pai on ethiounam mpnoute auō etsmme...]
and thus is not a straightforward "noun-syntagm predicate" case; moreover, no
account is taken of the rhetoricity of the whole complex — answers to rhetorical
questions are "pseudo-answers"; this applies also to Rom. 8:33 — or of the
extraordinary syntactic adherence of the Coptic translations of the Epistles to the
Greek original.) Now, to judge from the concord of *pe* (and perhaps also from the
absence of zero-determination in the focus) pattern b₃ is probably a component of
the Cleft Sentence patterns with a variable (i.e. phoric) *pe-/p-* (*N pe/te/ne et-* and
pet-/tet-/net-); but not of the pattern with immutable *pe-/p* (our NS pattern [c]): a
unitary statement for these two cases is no more justified than would be, say, a
combined treatment of the WH-, THAT- and ZERO-*glose*-forms in English Cleft Sen-
tences. The case of a *personal-pronoun* focus with the immutable *pe et-* (Catena 6,
nthōten pe ethnanau ephnouti) is different — here we evidently have to do with the
anok pe set (see above). Indeed, it is rather the not too solid evidence for com-
mutable *pe* after personal pronouns that calls for an explanation (*nto/ntos tet-*,
anon/ntōtn net- etc. e.g. Shenoute Leip. III 48).

Finally, the historical exposé (170f.), which also is inaccurate and unacceptably
naive. For Coptic, only *pet-* and *et-* gloses are represented (the *vedette* for *et-* is
indicated as "p-NP", which is in reality the only focus not attested to my knowl-
edge in any dialect for this construction); the special presentative function and pat-
terns are ignored in all phases; the charts are unstructured (all patterns given equal
status); arrows indicate categorial or formal shifts indiscriminately.

(c) In Coptic, *the pattern repertory* is more complicated than is apparent from
Callender's account. The following details, presented here merely to highlight the
complexity of the picture, are admittedly incomplete: a definitive study of the Cop-
tic CS must still be undertaken, on the basis of well-defined and well-observed cor-
puses, resolving dialectal and sub-dialectal diasystems. The most pressing unre-
solved questions concern focus constituency, the variability of the nexus-marker or
formal theme *pe* and the diasystemic distribution of the patterns, on which depends
also the ultimate question of their function or value (in Bohairic, the paradigm is
shorter and the functional charge of its terms — e.g. of # FOC *et-* # — accordingly
higher; the same may be true for "Middle Egyptian").

INITIAL FOCUS:

Bohairic: FOC *pe phē et-* (FOC.: *pronoun/proper name*) — more common than in
    Sahidic.
    FOC *peet-* (FOC.:? *pe* variable).
    FOC *pet-* (FOC.:? *p-* invariable).
    FOC *et-* (FOC.: SHISHA-HALEVY 1981: 322f.).

Sahidic: FOC *pe pet-* (FOC.: *pronoun/proper name*).
    FOC *pe et-* (FOC.: ?).
    FOC *pet-₁*: *pet-* gender/number-variable: *pet-/tet-/net-* (FOC. seems least
        restricted; a normal construction for pers. pronouns).
    FOC *pet-₂*: *pet-* invariable (FOC.: esp. pronouns?).

FOC *pe ef-*: (FOC.: interrogative pronouns: Mt. 6:27, Lc. 19:31, Joh.
    7:51, as variant reading for other patterns).
FOC *et-* (FOC.: personal pronouns, esp. interlocutives?) — see below,
    (d).
FOC *ef-* (circ.) (FOC. [in Shenoute]: interrogative and non-interrogative
    indefinite pronouns, certain propositional phrases: SHISHA-HALEVY
    1986: 85ff. I note that *personal pronouns* occur as foci with a Second
    Tense variant reading for a relative *glose* form, in the case of double
    focalization [twin simultaneous foci, adverbial and pronominal]: Joh.
    9:34, 10:18, Shenoute Leip. IV 12.)

INITIAL TOPIC:

Second Tense + FOC (FOC. [Shenoute]: actantial interrogative pronouns:
    einaouem-ou, ere-nim nana nan; determinated relative; SHISHA-HALEVY
    1986: 82f.).

Three final remarks on pattern formalities: (1) Polotsky does *not* say (in
1962: 413 n. 2 = *CP* 418, *pace* Callender 63) that *pe et-* is more prevalent in
Bohairic, or that *pet-* is more normal in Sahidic. (2) It is not true that "interroga-
tives must be clefted in Coptic... (this is) a requirement that is hard and fast and
admits of no exceptions" (80f.): *nim af-* is a well-known Bohairic construction (cf.
SHISHA-HALEVY 1981: 332 n. 36), and Shenoutean Sahidic supplies us with the well-
attested construction of the Basic Perfect (and Basic Imperfect) with *tōn* "where?"
and *naš nhe* "how?", and the Basic Perfect with *nouēr* "how much" (adv.), SHISHA-
HALEVY 1986: 97. (3) The need for exceptional analytic sensitivity is nowhere
greater than in CS-like constructions. A case illustrating this well is the hermeneu-
tical (autonomous and initial, though relative in form!) pattern # *ete N pe et-* #,
which is *not* a focalizing pattern: # *ete-niethnos ne etkolj* #, # *ete-nē ne etausōtem
eroou* # (Catena 128, 126 and often). Obviously, hermeneutical grammar is a case
apart — but so is any grammatically idiosyncratic texteme.

(d) *anok et-*: described as "rare" (65, 69) or of "extremely limited use" (164,
181), is a striking instance of the author's "tactics of exclusion", by which incon-
venient exx. are simply ignored. His claim to have quoted "in toto those attested
in the corpus" is unanswerable only because he never lets on what this corpus is.
He quotes in all nine exx. from Leipoldt, one from the Sahidic John (ignoring
important variant readings). In Leipoldt, two more, contradicting the author's the-
sis of lexemic restriction, come to light almost immediately (III 104, *ntok etōš ntok
etsōtm*; IV 98, *ntoou etrōše*; but not all cases quoted by him "deal with verbs of
cognition" [71], consider his exx. 12-14); similarly in John (5:45 *anok etnakatē-
gorei*, with variant readings: neither present, nor "verb of cognition" — the really
important fact, namely the focus being the *actor* of the thematic verb, goes unmen-
tioned). There are many more exx. in literary and non-literary Sahidic, and the
pattern is especially important, systemically speaking, in Bohairic (see SHISHA-HA-
LEVY 1981: 322) and "Oxyrhynchite" (SHISHA-HALEVY 1983: 318ff.). The assertion
(71f.) that the topicalized verb constituency is restricted to "verbs of cognition" —
and the construction is an "idiomatic expression", "no longer productive" and by
implication a "fossil" is unacceptable: the first claim is disproved by the evidence

in any corpus, and the three last mean little, since unverifiable. (However, exact information on the *glose* constituency and the ratio of interlocutive vs. delocutive focal pronouns in Sahidic would certainly be welcome.) Equally fallacious is the claim that the construction is not found outside the present, see POLOTSKY 1962: § 9; if it *is* more usual in the present, this may have to do with the fact that the perfect *(e)ntaf-* may be decoded as Second Tense (with the pronoun a topicalized subject).

To analyse *et-* as the "predicate" (65) is to fly in the face of the functional evidence; it is once again traceable, in Callender's case, to Till's grammar, see *OLZ* 1962 p. 479 (= *CP* 270); POLOTSKY 1962: 414f. (= *CP* 419f.); already the *Etudes*, 55 (= *CP* 159). (On p. 69 the author implies that the "first member" of any CS is its subject: which is incorrect, even if he means "*agens*".)

(e) The functional evaluation of the Cleft Sentence:

(1) the conventional descriptions, e.g. "argumentative" and "polemic" are all grammatically relevant only as text-grammatical functions, not universal, preter-analytic (or, what amounts to the same, "world of discourse") notions. The cotext must be formalized into patterns and subpatterns, in which the Cleft Sentences are correlatable with other segmental and suprasegmental signals. The terms "information" vs. "argument" are surely meaningless in such circular statements as "in contrast to narration, which provides information, argumentation provides arguments, which may or may not have any new information in them" (79). The author's non-structural functional appraisal (76f.), hinging on a simplistic differentiation between "narrative" and "argumentative", is inadequate, since (a) "argumentative" is incommensurable with "narrative" as textual characterizations of grammatical relevance ("textemes"), and (b) this typology does not exhaust or even adequately describe real textemic differentiation or diasystems, and (c) the CS as a formal entity features in dialogic and non-dialogic, narrative and expositive, rhetorical or non-rhetorical textemes (although its polemic role is perhaps characteristic of dialogue). Textemes are describable and indeed defined by grammatical means employed and by idiosyncratic *systèmes de valeur*, and not vice versa (although both planes of expression and content must evidently be fully satisfied by the description).

The author's statement to the effect that the role of the CS is one of focus or emphasis is unsatisfactory, since banal; a precise paradigmatic definition of *opposition* on a *scale* of focality is what one expects. For interrogative foci, for instance, the pattern is conditioned, emphasis is non-pertinent, hence absent; "incomplete predication" topics have a similar devaluating effect; the structural relevance of other focalizing and topicalizing constructions such as the Second Tenses, expressly denied by the author (62) is compelling. Even such means of marking a verb-lexeme as focal, as are evident in *hnouraše afraše* "he did rejoice indeed" (Joh. 3 : 29) have their synchronic and diachronic bearing on the question. Such paradigms in a *système de valeur* can only be determined in definite textual slots — the CS *in response* differs from the CS in allocution, the narrative-initial CS from the paragraph-initial or non-initial (parenthetic), and so on. No more helpful is the "discovery" that topic constituent of the CS is "presupposed", "known", "deducible" (79f.) — this, with rather more sophistication, is after all the definition basis of every topic as such. The same applies to the claim (81) that "the cleft member of any cleft sentence is under question", which could be — and has always been — applied, as definition, to any *focus* and even *rheme* ("logical predicate"). A word on the English "translation paradigm" offered in equivalence to Egyptian Cleft Sen-

tences (168ff., 183f.), which consists of: a Cleft Sentence ("It is N who did"), a focus-initial "Nominal Sentence" with a definite relative theme ("N is the one who did") and an unmarked verbal sentence with an italicized *agens* ("*N* did", an orthographic approximation of prosodic prominence); it contributes precisely nothing to our understanding of the roles of the Coptic construction, being no more than a selective list of means of *mise en relief* in English. In his diachronic charts (170f.) the author uses all translation forms, as it seems indiscriminately. There is of course a very considerable difference in the value of the CS and generally structuring of the paradigm(s) of emphasizing constructions between different languages. Were we to relate Coptic contrastively to modern European CS-languages in this functional respect, the Coptic pattern would occupy (alongside French) the middle ground, between the extremes of Celtic (with historically speaking many CS patterns quite devaluated and others revalorizing them) and English/German, with the CS of full functional value.

Illustrative of the inadequacy of the functional dichotomy, "argument" *vs.* "(narrative) information" or "calling in question" (*vs.* what?) postulated here, are apocritic CS like: (Q.) "Why are you walking alone, and no one accompanying you?" — (A.) *prro pentafouehsahne nai... afjoos ehoun ehrai je-mpertrelaau eime epšaje*" "The King instructed me... and said to me 'Let no one know of the matter'", 1 Reg. 21 : 1(2)-2(3), or (ibid. 25 : 40) *daueid pentaftnnooun šaro* "David sent us to you" (giving the reason for David's servants being there); text-initial ones like *šomte netpŏ nagathon netkĕ ehrai hahtnneuerĕu* "Three good weights were once lying on each other..." (Shenoute Leipoldt III 27) or *ourŏme pe, pejaf, eountaf mmau noušĕre auŏ šeere snte* "A man — he said — once had a son and two daughters" (ibid. 96); rhetorical-exclamative ones like *poou pentapjoeis eire mpioujai* "Today has the Lord wrought salvation" (1 Reg. 11 : 13) or *pirĕti rŏ on pe etafais* "Thus he did" (Boh., Catena 127). Instead of the conventional categorization, I would propose something like the following as provisional text-functional typology, for Egyptian and Coptic alike:

(a) The CS a text-initial and paragraph-initial delimitation (boundary) signal.
(b) The CS a dialogic response-form ("explanatory", "presentative": apocritic, parenthetic).
(c) The CS "polemic" (e.g. in the case of contrastive or distinctive emphasis).
(d) The CS non-pertinent, or of low pertinence (the case of interrogative foci and certain topics conditioning this focalization pattern).

Functions (c) and (d), perhaps (b), apply also to Second-Tense ("emphatic") topics and the so-called Participial Statement. (Chapter Five of Gunn's *Studies in Egyptian Syntax* in the best treatment of the functional aspect of this construction for Middle Egyptian. May I avail myself of this opportunity to call for a reprint of Gunn's masterly work, the most intelligent and sensitive grammatical treatment to date of Old and Middle Egyptian?)

(2) The non-polemic, "presentative" CS (function [b] above) in Middle Egyptian has been discussed by Polotsky (POLOTSKY 1976: 41ff.); to his references there (n. 64) to treatments of the comparable role of the French *phrase coupée*, add the paper by M. Rothenberg, "Les propositions relatives à antécédent explicite introduites par un présentatif", *Etudes de ling. appliquée* (n.s.) 2 (1971) 102-117, with a clear and cogent typology of forms and functions. The author (186f.) has either misunderstood Polotsky's drift in isolating the pattern # *ink pw* + *adv. verb-form* # and confused it with the glossing *mrr. f pw* (subsuming both under "sentential cleft-

ing"), or follows in this respect Junge, *Syntax d. mittelägyptischen Literatursprache*, Mainz 1978, 60ff. (Junge sees *sḏm.f pw* as the "prototype" of *ink pw* + ADV. VERB FORM, ignoring the difference in the type of nexus predicated by them — a verbal [*verb-actor*] nexus in the former, a "subnex" [(*pro*)*noun* + *adnexal expansion form*] in the latter case; "predication of a sentence by/of *pw*" is too vague. Functionally, too, Junge overlooks the difference between the two in text-functional role: "es war so, dass das und das geschah" approximates only the former, while for the latter, presentative-apocritic, something like "(the reason/explanation/background situation) is that...".

Without addressing the question of whether this is a "true" CS or not (a question deprived of its sting in a text-functional decoding appreciation of patterns, and signalling evaluation of their constituents, and pointless anyway in the absence of suprasegmental data) I would like to add one or two examples to Polotsky's material:

(1) Shipwrecked Sailor 61f. ("I heard a stormy noise... trees were breaking, the earth was shaking...") — *gm.n.i ḥfȝw pw iw.f m-iyt* "I found that (the reason was) a snake coming", *pace* Junge (*Syntax* 42) "eine Schlange war es: sie kam" — "*ḥfȝw* ist Prädikat des *pw*-Satzes"; the predicate is rather *ḥfȝw... iw.f m-iyt*, circumstantial *iw*-conversion, and the theme *pw*.
(2) Westcar 10,4 (situation-presenting:) *st pw ntt ḥr mn.s* (The situation is:) "a woman is in pain".
(3) Sinuhe B 262 *ḥrt pw wnn.s m ḥt.i* "there was fear in my body" (the reason Sinuhe gives for being deprived of speech in the presence of the king). The *sḏm.f* (*wnn.s*) is circumstantial.

I believe the following are the most significant cases of the text-initial and paragraph-initial delimitative function of the CS (function [a]) in ME:

(1) The "*prt pw ir.n.f*" construction, formally speaking focalizing a (lexically restricted) verb, yet in suppletive complementary relationship with narrative-advancing delimited forms; until the text-functional hierarchy or *système de valeur* of '*ḥ'.n.f* [*sḏm.n.f*], *sḏm.in.f* and *iw sḏm.n.f* is established, it will be hasty to postulate the allo-partner of this construction, but the first-named is a likely candidate.
(2) Text-openings like Peasant R 1,1 *s pw wn*; analogues with both relative or circumstantial glose forms occur throughout Egyptian, Coptic included (French parallels in Rothenberg's paper quoted above; others occur in most Celtic and other "CS languages").
(3) Cases of the PRON./PROPER NAME *pw* + ADV. VERB-FORM construction: Shipwrecked Sailor 89ff. *ink pw ḥȝ.kwi* (subnarrative initial); CT II 334-5 b, 346 b *Ḥr pw ḏd.n.f n...* (v.l. *ḏd.in Ḥr n...*), IV 92k *ink pw ḏd.n n.f Šw* (subnarrative, conversation-reporting episode). So too II 274-6 *R' pw ḥr mdt ḥn' Imy-wḥm.f* (although *pw* here may be anaphoric to *iryt ḥskt... ḥr.s*, 274 b).

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In the foregoing pages, I have touched lightly on abuses of method and errors of judgement in the book under review. Much more could and ought to be commented upon, notably the author's view of tense and aspect and his imposition of these views on Coptic, which I find exceptionable not only in the matter of terminology, but especially in the handling of text-linguistic issues.

After the doctrinaire labels in the author's exposition have been peeled off, the ultimate question to be asked is whether his approach awards us any new insights into the fundamental issues under discussion? The answer is, quite frankly, no. A reader of this book is left with the feeling of dejected emptiness after witnessing so much mere manipulation of language phenomena. I detect little of value in this blurring, and blurred, work, which barely approximates a description, let alone puts the subject on a new footing. It is a wasted opportunity: the Egyptian and Coptic Nominal Sentence must still await a structural, text based, monographic treatment.

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